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Proliferation in the use of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) in civil and military operations
has presented a multitude of human factors challenges; from how to bridge the gap
between demand and availability of trained operators, to how to organize and present
data in meaningful ways. Utilizing the Design Research Methodology (DRM), a series of
closely related studies with subject matter experts (SMEs) demonstrate how the focus
of research gradually shifted from “how many systems can a single operator control”
to “how to distribute missions among operators and systems in an efficient way”. The
first set of studies aimed to explore the modal number, i.e., how many systems can a
single operator supervise and control. It was found that an experienced operator can
supervise up to 15 UASs efficiently using moderate levels of automation, and control
(mission and payload management) up to three systems. Once this limit was reached,
a single operator’s performance was compared to a team controlling the same number
of systems. In general, teams led to better performances. Hence, shifting design efforts
toward developing tools that support teamwork environments of multiple operators with
multiple UASs (MOMU). In MOMU settings, when the tasks are similar or when areas of
interest overlap, one operator seems to have an advantage over a team who needs to
collaborate and coordinate. However, in all other cases, a team was advantageous over
a single operator. Other findings and implications, as well as future directions for research
are discussed.
Keywords: unmanned aerial systems, control ratio, UAV, decision support systems, DSS, automation,
macrocognition, human factors
INTRODUCTION
The continuing proliferation in the use of UASs in both civil and military operations has presented
a multitude of human factors challenges, including assessing the cognitive capabilities of one
operator to simultaneously supervise and control multiple platforms, evaluating the advantages
and disadvantages of an individual operator vs. a team, and finding meaningful ways to organize
and present data. Underlying many of these challenges is the issue of how automation capabilities
can best be utilized to assist human operators in handling increasing complexity and workload
(Fern et al., 2011).
When the first unmanned aerial systems (UASs) were introduced in the 1980s, engineers and
military leaders were content with their ability to extend capabilities of intelligence perception
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beyond the capacities that were there before. Once these
technological advancements became part of a routine, it became
evident that the ratio of personnel vs. crafts issue will rise. There
are multiple reasons why managers and leaders are interested
in reducing the man-machine control ratio, only to mention a
few: fewer operators mean less need for training, less diversity in
training, and reduced costs of manpower and training.
The focus on operator-UAS ratio corroborated even more
in light of the US Office of the Secretary Defense Roadmap
for unmanned aircraft systems (UASs: 2005-2030)1, which
delineates the need to investigate the “appropriate conditions
and requirements under which a single pilot would be
allowed to control multiple airborne UA [unmanned aircraft]
simultaneously.” Since then, till today the question of how many
UASs or UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) can one operator
control or supervise has become a vital question that many
researchers try to answer (e.g., Chen et al., 2013; Goodrich and
Cummings, 2014).
Cummings et al. (2007a) proposed a hierarchical control
model to portray control loops for a single operator in control
of one UAV or multiple systems. In this three-level model, the
innermost loop (Flight controls) represents the need for basic
guidance and motion control (i.e., keeping the aircraft in stable
flight) and is the most critical. If operators must interact in
this loop, the cost will be very high since this loop requires
significant cognitive resources. The second loop (Navigation)
represents the actions that should be executed to meet mission
constraints, such as routes to waypoints, time on targets, and
avoidance of threat areas. The outermost loop (Mission and
payload management) represents the highest levels of control—
decisions which require knowledge-based reasoning that must be
made to meet overall mission requirements. Health and status
monitoring are tasks that cross all three loops, where the operator
is required to perform continuous supervision to ensure that all
systems are operating within normal limits. Hence, in order for
one operator to be able to control multiple systems, operators will
need to interact primarily at the outermost loop via a mission
and payload manager while relegating routine navigation and
motion control tasks to the automation. For example, given such
significant autonomy, one operator could control 4–5 vehicles
(Cummings et al., 2007a) and apply supervisory control for up
to 12 vehicles (Cummings and Guerlain, 2007).
Higher levels of automation will enable operators to increase
the number of unmanned systems they control and supervise,
however, extensive use of automation can also introduce
human performance costs such as loss of situation awareness,
skill degradation, complacency, increased mental workload
(Parasuraman et al., 2000) and automation bias (Mosier and
Skitka, 1996). Hence, supervisory control of multiple UASs raises
questions concerning how to balance system autonomy and
human interaction (Calhoun et al., 2011, 2013). Furthermore, the
challenge of incorporating automation in one vehicle is replaced
by the need to keep the human “in the loop” of the activities
for all vehicles (Ruff et al., 2002). Careful system design can
1Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Roadmap,
2005-2030.” Washington DC: DoD.
mitigate performance costs and can be achieved by: allowing
flexibility in the design of function allocation (i.e., which tasks
will be performed by the human and which will be performed by
the system), the level of automation to be implemented within
each function (Parasuraman et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2013; Gu
et al., 2014), and the operators’ level of trust in the automation
(Clare et al., 2015). Eventually, when flight control becomes fully
automated, operators will manipulate the payloads rather than fly
the vehicles (e.g., Cooper and Goodrich, 2008).
Ruff et al. (2002) compared the effects of automation level
and decision-aid fidelity on the number of simulated remotely
operated vehicles (ROVs) that could be successfully controlled
by a single operator during a target acquisition task. Their results
indicated that an automation level incorporating management-
by-consent had clear performance advantages over the more
autonomous (management-by-exception) and less autonomous
(manual control) levels of automation. Calhoun et al. (2011)
used a UAV simulation environment to evaluate two applications
of autonomy levels across two primary control tasks: allocation
(assignment of sensor tasks to vehicles) and router (determining
vehicles’ flight plans). Their results showed that performance on
both primary tasks and many secondary tasks was better when
the level of automation was the same across the two sequential
primary tasks. Thus, having the level of automation similar across
closely coupled tasks reduced mode awareness problems, which
can negate the intended benefits of a fine-grained application of
automation.
Adaptive automation (AA) alters the level of automation
dynamically during operation. This allows the automation to
account for individual differences and allows the automation
to be more flexible, context-dependent, and user-specific (Saqer
et al., 2011). Wilson and Russell (2007) demonstrated that the
customization of automation and difficulty level to the individual
operator had greater potential benefit than AA developed
based on group performance means. Cummings et al. (2010)
examined the impact of increasing automation re-planning rates
on operator performance and workload when supervising a
decentralized network of heterogeneous unmanned vehicles.
They claimed that the future of one operator controlling multiple
UVs requires automated planners, which are faster than humans
at path planning and resource allocation. They examined three
increasing levels of re-planning, and showed that rapid re-
planning can cause high operator workload, ultimately resulting
in poorer overall system performance. Calhoun et al. (2013)
designed an interface enabling pilots to flexibly change the role
of automation during the mission, transitioning between four
control modes ranging from manual to high level “plays.” Their
results showed that this approach is promising for single operator
supervisory control of multiple UASs, however participants
claimed that flexibility should be increased even more, enabling
the operator to employ multiple control modes in a single task.
While automation can definitely increase the number of UASs
a single operator can supervise and control, Hancock et al.
(2007) raised a concern with the ongoing debate over how many
UASs should or can a single operator control. The functional
design questions that were raised were: (a) should researchers
and designers continue to strive for a higher ratio, and, (b) if they
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decide to go forward in this direction, what is the modal number?
As with all design questions, the immediate answer was simple: It
depends. To be sure, the human being as the ultimate adaptive
system may be able to demonstrate multiple UAS control, but we
consider this an instance of what design can do, not what design
should do. In response, John Senders commented that “with
appropriate control and display systems, the handling of more
than one machine remains both useful and practical. Simultaneous
(actually, appropriately sampled) control of many high-order
systems by one operator was demonstrated to be feasible when
the displays of attitude are appropriately quickened. Henry P.
Birmingham demonstrated this many decades ago by showing
excellent simultaneous control of 2 two-dimensional, third-order
systems (Birmingham and Taylor, 19542) . . . . Even modestly
intelligent design would allow multiple UAVs and multiple displays
to be searched or monitored efficiently with good connectivity
between the displays. The individual operator is therefore the
appropriate unit of analysis only when such bottlenecks occur
at that level. More generally, if one views the collective team
as an integrated, flexible system, then the very question of the
UAV:Operator ratio itself becomes irrelevant.”
After decades of field practice, the importance of operational
use of UASs in combat and in civil operations has increased
tremendously. Different team configurations consisting of
Multiple Operators and Multiple UASs (MOMU) are nowadays
evaluated (e.g., Mekdeci and Cummings, 2009; Gao et al., 2014),
implying that indeed the operator to UAS ratio has become an
outcome but not a target of its own.
MOMU is a relatively new operational setup for covering areas
of interest, particularly in reconnaissance missions. It is highly
relevant for homeland security and surveillance operations. A
mode of one operator controlling multiple UASs can often
increase the cognitive burden of its operators. MOMU setups
aim to prevent high operator workload and low situation
awareness, and can be very advantageous in oﬄoading tasks
to distribute workload among operators. Furthermore, MOMU
setups can be advantageous also in terms of utilization of assets,
as they contribute to increasing payload efficiency and system
effectiveness. However, MOMU settings initiate new challenges
for operators as they require switching of information sources,
i.e., tasks, missions, video feeds, or camera manipulations and
responsibilities among operators.
Switching is a time-critical, cognitively demanding task.
Cognitive costs of switching may be loss of orientation and
situation awareness (SA), increase in workload, and decrease
in efficiency of verbal team communication and coordination.
Consequently, switching between sources can disrupt operator
performance (Draper et al., 2008; Squire and Parasuraman, 2010),
and generate slower and less accurate responses compared to
performing a single type of task (Allport et al., 1994; Monsell,
2In 1954, Taylor and Birmingham, published a paper in the Journal of the
Institute of Radio Engineers (now IEEE), titled “A Design Philosophy for Man-
Machine Control Systems” (Birmingham and Taylor, 1954). The article discussed
the manual control of a submarine, which is a complex control problem because
of the massiveness of the boat and the nature of the control surfaces. They also
described “quickening”, a clever example of how one could augment the display of
information to improve the stability of control.
2003). In MOMU environments, where operators need to
handoff aircrafts, payloads, targets, or missions to each other,
switches may have a vital effect on mission accomplishment.
Over the past decades our team has advanced and improved
operational concepts for UASs operators in surveillance and
recon missions. Like most others, our studies began with
examining the UAS to operator ratio, then to how to increase
capacity of a single operator by utilizing tools and automation
modes, which gradually shifted toward the MOMU framework.
Here we report and revisit these multi-phase studies. Our goal
is to demonstrate how the focus of research and practice moved
toward a more collaborative operational concept that enables
distribution of work and assets among multiple operators. We
demonstrate the progress that has been occurring in this human-
unmanned system research and how we perceive it should be
further directed. We begin with operator to UAS ratio studies.
Then, we demonstrate how the MOMU concept evolved. Lastly,
we discuss why the changes in UASs control concepts are relevant
for other less mature human-robot control domains.
The series of studies has been utilizing the Design Research
Methodology (DRM; Blessing and Chakrabarti, 2009). DRM
is sometimes called “Improvement Research” emphasizing the
problem solving/performance-improving nature of the activity.
It enables researchers and analysts to rapidly develop and test
prospective improvements, deploy what they have learned about
what works, and add to their knowledge to continuously improve
the performance of the system (Vaishnavi and Kuechler, 2004).
Our aim was to look at the problem from different levels of
activity (e.g., supervise, control, mission management), settings
(individual vs. team), resources (number of operators, number of
vehicles), and automation levels.
In this paper, we do not portray details of every single step in
each individual study. Our focus was on the design implications
that stemmed from each study phase. This was a conscious
strategy, not to be reductionists per se, but to allow examination
of the operational concept issues from a higher perspective. All
the evaluations that are presented were conducted with highly
experienced UAS operators (subject matter experts; SMEs) which
is necessary for DRM.
METHODS
We utilized the DRM, with SMEs which focuses on what
works, for whom, and under what conditions. In this model
(see Figure 1) all designs begin with Awareness of a problem;
then usually from the existing knowledge of the problem area,
solutions are suggested, after the suggestion phase, there is an
attempt to implement an artifact according to the suggested
solution—the Development phase. Partially or fully successful
implementations are then evaluated with potential users.
Development, Evaluation and further Suggestions are frequently
iteratively performed in the course of the research (design) effort.
The basis of the iteration, the flow from partial completion
of the cycle back to Awareness of the Problem, is indicated
by the Circumscription arrow. Conclusion indicates termination
of a specific design project. New knowledge production is
indicated by the arrows labeled Circumscription and Operation
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FIGURE 1 | Reasoning in the Design Research Cycle (cf. Kuechler and Vaishnavi, 2008).
and Goal Knowledge (Vaishnavi and Kuechler, 2004; Kuechler
and Vaishnavi, 2008). The goal of DRM is to help design research
become effective and efficient by making the most out of valuable
resources and applying gathered knowledge “on the move.” It is
particularly suitable for complex interactive systems.
The studies took place at a designated laboratory at Synergy
Integration Ltd. which was set up to resemble a typical
UAS control room (see Figure 2). The work environment
was simulated, but “true to life,” mimicking UAS military
operators’ work, who need to operate UASs while placed in a
remote designated cabin. The lab consisted of several connected
workstations containing a simulation system, which could be
configured according to the task and needs (i.e., number
of vehicles, individual vs. team operation, time limitations,
use of decision support tools, etc.). In this setting, cognitive
tasks such as planning, detecting problems, and managing
uncertainty (macro-cognitive processes) could be evaluated.
Level of automation and mission components were chosen using
arrangements similar to the control loops of Cummings et al.
(2007a).
STUDIES
In the following we describe four studies, with their
sub-conditions. The earlier two studies examined the
operator/platform ratio in several operational scenarios
and tasks. The first study examined the number of UASs one
operator can supervise (health and status monitoring). The
second study examined the number of UASs one operator can
control (Mission and payload management) at a single instance.
Studies 3 and 4 compared performance of one operator vs. a
team of operators controlling the same number of UVs (MOMU
studies). Study 3 took place in the UAS environment, while
Study 4 took place in the UGV (unmanned ground vehicle)
environment. This enabled us to further examine commonalities
between the domains of operation. In the following, each study
with its different experimental conditions is described.
FIGURE 2 | The simulated environment. In the configuration shown here
three operators are collaboratively operating three UASs at the same time.
Study 1
Problem: Starting the project, in what may now seem archaic
for the UAS domain, health monitoring was identified as
the main attention pitfall for operators. Back then, operators
had to check the system’s health repeatedly while they were
performing the flight mission. Displayed health data had to be
compared manually against a manufacturer checklist, an error
prone process with heavy reliance on memory and specifically
prospective memory (see Figure 3).
The first study aimed to facilitate the health monitoring task,
using automation and tools in order to increase the efficiency
and the number of UAV’s that one operator could supervise
simultaneously.
Study question: How many UAVs can one operator supervise
(health monitoring) efficiently?
Participants: Five highly experienced male operators. All are
reserve soldiers in active duty. They had 4–7 years of experience
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FIGURE 3 | Study 1 illustration. Left: the original health data form; Mid: The modified health data form with two-step (orange and red) fault indicators (condition B);
Right: Graphic presentation of a trend in the zoom-in view of one health parameter (condition C).
in operating military UASs (mean: 5.2), and their age ranged
from 23 to 30 (mean: 26.6). SMEs were compensated for their
time. The same five participants performed each one of the study
conditions, hence a within-subject design was used. Since in
DRM one makes incremental design changes, and this process
takes time, there was a significant time gap between the different
conditions (at least 1 month).
Initial State—Manual, Sequential Supervising
Task
1:5—one operator manually supervised five UAVs of the same
kind (utilizing a paper-based checklist).
Procedure
For each UAV, 13 health indices were displayed numerically
on a form. In addition, two location indices were displayed on
a map (X-Y coordinates, related to the pre-defined route). To
evaluate the health status of the UAV, participants had to compare
the values on the on-line form to a paper-based checklist with
the appropriate value ranges. On the screen, the operator could
view the health data of only one UAV at a time (i.e., the task
required sequential browsing of the health forms). Operators
performed continuous manual health monitoring by comparing
each index in each form to the desired values written in the
hard-copy. While doing this, operators had to relate to different
flight stages, as health values varied as a function of flight
stage.
Results
The cycle time to supervise one UAV was very long—5min
(SD = 0.7). The time to detect a fault depended on its location
on the form and most faults were detected in late stages of the
flaw. Detecting the fault source was almost impossible and took
on average 13min (SD = 6). Deviations from the planned route
were detected late, after an average of 3min (SD = 0.2), hence,
only after there was a meaningful deviation from the route on the
map (scale: 1:50,000).
Operators indicated that the task was difficult and exhaustive
within less than 1 h of supervising. They complained on high
workload and that they could not imagine succeeding in
supervising another (6th) UAV.
Condition A—Simultaneous Supervising
Task
1:5—one operator manually supervised five UAVs with two
changes relative to the initial state condition.
Suggestion—design change from initial state
To facilitate manual health monitoring, two design
implementations were introduced: (1) for each data item an
intact indication was added, depending on the flight stage: Intact,
Warning (5% lower or higher than the intact value), or Fault; (2)
all UAV health data forms were displayed simultaneously.
Results
The cycle time to supervise one UAV has decreased from 5 to
2min (SD = 0.4). Most faults were detected in early stages (an
average of 5 s to detect a fault). Detection of fault source and route
deviations did not improve or differ from the initial state.
Condition A+—Like A but with More Systems
Task
1:10—one operator supervised manually 10 UAVs with the same
design as in Condition A.
Suggestion—design change from Condition A
Five additional UAVs were added to the supervising task. The
limitation to 10 was due to screen size (which enabled displaying
up to 10 UAV health forms simultaneously).
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Results
Similar results to condition A—the cycle time to supervise one
UAV remained 2min on average (SD = 0.4). Most faults were
detected in early stages (average of 5 s to detect a fault). Detection
of fault source and route deviations did not improve from the
initial state.
Condition B—Grouping the Health Indices
Task
1:10–1:20—Operators started with supervising 10 UAVs. During
the evaluation, UAVs were added gradually until a single operator
was supervising 20 UAVs at a time. To facilitate supervising, the
12 health indices were grouped into four categories.
Suggestion—design change from Condition A+
There was a change in the display design: the two location
indices and one health index were removed (the focus was now
only on health parameters). The remaining 12 health indices
were grouped into four meaningful categories (e.g., engine,
communication, etc.). For each of them, three intact indications
were displayed: Intact, Warning and Fault. The shape of the
indication icon implied on the contained data in each category.
For example, the group containing communication measures
(increase/decrease) had an indication icon of arrows pointing up
or down.
For each UAV only group indications were displayed on the
health data form. The operator could open the full form by
clicking on the indication group.
Results
Results were similar to the ones in condition A. Operators
reported upon high workload and a feeling of losing control once
the 17th UAV was added.
Condition B+—Single Indicator for Each System
Task
1:10–1:20—the operator started supervising 10 UAVs. During the
study UAVs were added gradually until stopped at one operator
supervising 20 UAVs with a change in the way intact indications
were displayed.
Suggestion—design change from Condition B
The four group indications used in Condition B for each UAV
were replaced with one intact indication (icon) for each UAV
placed on the command and control map. The operator could
click on the icon and view the detailed form. In addition, an alert
was added for location deviation.
Results
Results were similar as in condition A, except for the time to
detect deviations from route which was dramatically shortened
to 5 s on average (instead of 3min in previous conditions).
Operators succeeded in supervising 15-17 UAVs.
Condition C—Addition of Malfunction/Health
Problem Trends
Task
1:10–1:20—Operators started with supervising 10 UAVs. During
the study UAVs were added gradually until stopped at one
operator supervising 20 UAVs. The major change was the
addition of a graph display to identify trends in health measures.
Suggestion—design change from Condition B+
For each indicator, a graph displaying its measured values and
intact indications was added. The graph was displayed once the
user clicked on the measure value from the health data form.
The purpose of this condition was to evaluate if time based
information on any specific indication could decrease the time
it took for operators to detect the fault source (i.e., aimed to
facilitate better malfunction source detection, see Figure 3).
Results
Results were the same as in condition A, except for the major
improvement in the time to detect the fault source, which
decreased to less than 5min in 95% of the cases (instead of
an average of 13min in all previous conditions). The ability to
view the behavior of the health-related measure over time has
helped the operators to understand and detect the source of the
fault. The downside of this measure is that it is only suitable for
mature systems where the number of faults is relative small, and
there is a clear well established link between the health-related
measure and its source. Operators succeeded in supervising up to
10 UAVs, mainly because here, more attention was allocated to
detecting the source of the fault than previously, and there was
not enough time for all the faults to be further examined.
Study 1 Summary
After performing the first study with its three main conditions,
it is possible to claim that one experienced operator can
supervise up to 15 UAVs efficiently using the level of automation,
the indication tools and the task characteristics described in
conditions B and B+. Nevertheless, since health monitoring
is only part of mission demands, it was necessary to further
investigate the issue of mission and payload management control
in Study 2.
Study 2
Problem: The “classical” ratio concern; there was a requirement
to increase the number of UAVs that one operator can control.
Study question: How many UAVs can one operator control
(mission and payload management) efficiently and how can this
ratio be improved.
Participants: Ten highly experienced male operators (SMEs)
with similar military background and skills. They had 3–10 years
of experience (mean: 5.6) —7 SMEs in operating military UASs
and 3 SMEs in operating other types of military electro-optical
sensors. Their age ranged from 23 to 30 (mean: 26). SMEs were
compensated for their time.
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FIGURE 4 | Twin UAV operation screen configuration and operational device (mouse).
Condition A—One to One vs. One to Two
Task
1:1 vs. 1:2—One operator tracks a moving target with one UAV
vs. two UAVs.
Comparing performance of tracking a moving target with
two UAVs (Twin UAV setup) vs. a single UAV, in an urban
environment. Twin UAV is a “pair of UAVs” handled and
operated as one system by one operator (see Figure 4). Either
UAV can serve as the master while the other one is slaved and
vice versa. Hence, only one payload needs to be controlled at a
time, and the enslaved UAV positions itself relative to the master.
The UAVs control is at a high level of automation via payload
management. Various parameters need to be set by the operator
for each UAV, prior to each sortie and can be changed during
the sortie (altitude, turn radius, camera field-of-view and position
shift angle between the UAVs).
Procedure
The experiment consisted of six experimental scenarios. Each
scenario was performed twice, once with one UAV and once with
the Twin UAV configuration. The order was counterbalanced
among participants. Each trial began with the target vehicle
in a specified position. The vehicle then started moving and
the operator was asked to keep it in sight as continuously as
possible (a lock-on Target feature could be used when the target
was visible). Task difficulty depended on the number of similar
vehicles in the scene (varied from 5 to 9) and on obstructions
when buildings occluded the target. The target vehicle looked
similar to other vehicles but had a unique mark. The four easier
scenarios lasted 3min each and the two more difficult ones
lasted 4min. Instructions about the user interface and the task, a
demonstration, and four Twin UAV and one single UAV training
trials preceded the experimental phase.
FIGURE 5 | Comparison of lock-on time (i.e., the proportion of time
during which the target was visible and locked by at least one UAV)
with “Twin UAV” setup and with a single UAV, by participant.
Results
Sampling ratio (time spent in “Lock-on target” mode relative to
the total duration of the scenario) was significantly (p < 0.05)
higher when participants used the Twin UAV (average 0.42, SD
0.12) than the single UAV (average 0.31, SD 0.04). No significant
interaction was found between scenario and UAV setup (twin vs.
single). Figure 5 shows the results for each participant.
Condition B —One to Three
Task
1:3—Here a more complex operational mission was used; one
operator was required to guard a building, track a suspicious
vehicle, and scan the shoreline using three UAVs (Tri-UAV), see
Figure 6.
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FIGURE 6 | Tri-UAV display, the screen is divided into four areas: video
feeds of the three UAVs marked with a colored frame for identification
(upper left, lower left, and lower right windows), and a command and
control map (upper right window). Note that all three UAVs are shown on
the map.
Procedure
The Tri-UAV display contained video feed windows for each
payload and a common map. The operator controlled the display
using a mouse and a keyboard. The mouse enabled the operator
to move the cursor between the map window and the video feed
windows, and point to a specific location.
The task took place in a densely built urban environment.
The operator had to: (a) guard a building with several entrances,
(b) track a suspicious vehicle, and (c) scan the shoreline. All
entrances and exits from and to the building were to be reported.
When a suspect vehicle exited the building, the operator had to
track it. Two UAVs were allocated to supervising the building
entrances while one UAV was used for surveillance (lock-on
target to track moving targets could be used). Each scenario was
4min long and contained eight events that the participant had to
attend to, events did not appear at the same time in the scene.
Results
Operators demonstrated difficulties in simultaneously processing
information from three separate locations/video feed sources
and failed to succeed in guarding the building and performing
additional tasks such as tracking the moving vehicle or scanning
the beach line. Only three operators out of the 10 were able to
complete the scenarios at some degree of success the remaining
seven had difficulties in performing the task and quit before the
scenarios ended.
Study 2 Summary
Experienced operators seemed to cope well with two video feed
windows when using the Twin UAV setup. Interestingly, without
being instructed to do so, operators intuitively enhanced their
performance by utilizing the dual setup. One method that was
used frequently by the operators was to choose a wide field-
of-view (FOV) angle in one UAV for overview, and a narrow
angle on the other UAV for recognition and tracking of the
target. Furthermore, in this type of configuration, since the
area of operation was limited, operators rarely used the map.
In general, operators thought that handling two sources was
difficult enough and that handling three devices may be too
demanding. This proved itself correct in condition B, when
operators had difficulties processing the information from the
three video feed sources. Note also that the area of operation
in condition B was wider. In order to succeed, operators stated
that there was a need for automated supporting tools. Following
these results, in study 3 an attempt was made to facilitate the
task by providing the operators with a toolkit containing situation
awareness enhancing indicators and decision-support tools.
Table 1 summarizes studies 1 and 2 as described above. For
each study, cognitive task demand, and automation level was
added in a separate column (in line with Cummings et al., 2007a).
See Table 2 for the levels of automation legend.
In the following studies performance of a team vs. a single
operator was compared in an attempt to understand the
feasibility and advantage of each mode, in the UAS domain
(Study 3) and in the UGV (unmanned ground vehicle) domain
(Study 4). Utilizing the DRM, and based on the findings of the
previous studies, tools and visual aids were added to the interface,
as specified in each study.
Study 3
Problem: Identify advantages and disadvantages of an individual
operator vs. a team. Performance of one operator was compared
to a team of (2–4) operators controlling the same number of
UAVs (up to four UAVs). Operators had to observe a building
and report of vehicles entering and existing the building. Vehicles
exiting the building that had specific characteristics had to be
further processed.
Study Question:Will a team of operators controlling a number
of UAVs perform better than one operator controlling the same
number of UAVs?
Condition A—Two Operators vs. One
Task
2:2: vs. 1:2—Two operators sharing control of two UAVs
compared to one operator controlling two UAVs.
Participants
Six highly experienced male operators (SMEs) with similar
military background and skills participated in this condition.
They had 2–7 years of experience in operating military UASs
(mean: 4), and their age ranged from 23 to 27 (mean: 24.8).
Procedure
Operators had to observe a building and report of vehicles
entering and exiting the building. Vehicles exiting the building
that had specific characteristics (i.e., suspicious vehicle) had
to be further processed (track and report). Two phases were
conducted, in the first phase no additional unique interaction
tools were provided. After the first phase, based on the findings
from study 2 and the difficulties operators had in performing the
task, supportive tools were provided, only to the single operator
in a form of a toolkit. The toolkit consisted of spatial anchoring
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1 UAVs HEALTH AND STATUS SUPERVISING
Initial state Supervise 13 health indices using a paper-based
checklist.
1:5 Health monitoring-I Operators indicated that the task was
difficult, exhaustive, and caused high
workload.
A Two design additions:
1. For each data item an intact indication was added
2. All UAV forms were displayed simultaneously.
1:5 Health monitoring -III Improved performance from the Initial
State.
A+ Display was the same as in condition A. However, five
additional UAVs were added to the monitoring task.
1:10 Health monitoring -III Similar results to condition A.
B 12 health indices were grouped into four meaningful
groups. For each UAV, only the group indications were
displayed on the form. For each group, three intact
indications were displayed (intact, warning, and fault).
The operator could open the full form by clicking on
the indication group.
1:20 Health monitoring -III Similar results to condition A. Operators
reported high workload and a feeling of
losing control after the 17th UAV was
added.
B+ The group indications used in Condition B for each
UAV were replaced with one intact indication (icon)
placed on the command and control map. The
operator could click on the icon and view the details. In
addition, an alert was added for location deviation.
1:20 Health monitoring -III Similar results to condition A, except for
the time to detect deviation from route
which was shortened. Operators
succeeded in supervising 15–17 UAVs.
C For each indicator, a graph displaying its measured
values and intact indications was added.
1:20 Health monitoring-III Similar results to condition A, except for
the time to detect the fault source, which
was shortened. Operators succeeded in
supervising up to 10 UAVs.
2 UAVs CONTROL—1-TO-1 AND 1-TO-MANY
A Tracking a vehicle once with one UAV and once with a
Twin UAV. Target lock-on could be used.
1:1 vs.1:2 Navigation—V Performance was significantly better using
two UAVs.
B The operator had to guard a building with several
entrances, track a suspected vehicle (target lock-on
could be used), and scan the beach line. 2 UAVs were
required for supervising the building while one UAV
was required for surveillance.
1:3 Navigation—V Mission
Management-II
Operators demonstrated difficulties in
processing information from three
separate sources.
*See Table 2 for the levels of automation legend.
capabilities like “sketch” and “revisit,” which enabled the operator
to request the system to automatically follow a pattern (perform
a sketch) or a jump through a list of points (perform a revisit
cycle) by generating (using mouse clicks) a list of points on top of
the payload image. In a similar way to Study 2’s Twin UAV setup
“Payload coupling” enabled the operator to enslave one UAV to
the other. Finally, “Camera guide” enabled the operator to fly
the UAV by following its camera (See Oron-Gilad et al., 2011 for
detailed description of several tools).
In phase 2 of the study, it was aimed to examine whether
the toolkit could support the single operator’s performance to a
degree superior to the team of two operators.
Results
Results are displayed in Table 3.
The team reported that the mission was calm up to a
degree of being boring. The single operator reported that the
mission was challenging but not overloading. The results of
the team were similar to the results of the single operator
using a toolkit. Multiple reporting of the same incident
and longer mission stabilization time occurred in the team
condition.
Condition B—Three Operators vs. One
Task
3:3 vs. 1:3—A team of three operators sharing control over
three UAVs were compared to one operator controlling three
UAVs. The same scenarios as in Condition A, the individual
operator could use the toolkit and the operators in the team
could not.
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Participants
Eight highly experienced male operators (SMEs) with similar
military background and skills participated in this condition.
They had 4–8 years of experience in operating military UASs
(mean: 5.4), and their age ranged from 25 to 30 (mean: 26.9).
SMEs were compensated for their time.
Results
Results are displayed in Table 4.
The team performed significantly better (p < 0.01) than
the single operator, however they again had more occasions
of multiple reporting of the same incident, and increased
stabilization time.
Condition B+—Four Operators vs. One
Task
4:4 vs. 1:4—A team of four operators sharing control of four
UAVs were compared to one operator controlling four UAVs.
Participants
Five highly experienced male operators (SMEs) with similar
military background and skills participated in this condition.
They had 3–5 years of experience in operating military UASs
(mean: 3.83), and their age ranged from 25 to 27 (mean: 25.5).
TABLE 2 | Levels of Automation (LOA) (cf Cummings et al., 2007a).
SV*-LOA C**−LOA Automation Description
1 I The computer offers no assistance; human must take
all decisions and actions.
2 II The computer offers a complete set of decision/action
alternatives.
3 III The computer offers a selection of decisions/actions.
4/5 IV The computer suggests one alternative and executes
that suggestion if the human approves (management
by consent).
6 V The computer suggests one alternative and allows the
human a restricted time to veto before automatic
execution (management by exception).
7/8/9/10 VI The human is not involved in the decision making
process; the computer decides and executes
autonomously.
*SV—The 10-level scale originally proposed by Sheridan and Verplank (1978).
**C—The combined categories of Cummings et al. (2007a).
Results
This setup was problematic to analyze. In the one operator
condition, single operators felt lost looking at four video
feeds and in some cases they just looked at three UAVs
or less (hence they neglected the fourth UAV). In the team
condition, coordination among the operators took a long time,
containing incessant verbal communication, and numerous
multiple reports.
Study 3 Summary
One operator could not control more than three UASs, even
with additional aids. Furthermore, without facilitating decision
support tools, it was difficult and ineffective for a team of
four operators to control four UASs as well. The implications
of this study were twofold: each single operator can benefit
from designated tools that assist in conducting the mission,
e.g., coupling or sketch and revisit. A team of operators must
be familiarized with a set of rules or provided with a set of
tools to facilitate collaboration. Otherwise, they are prone to
report multiple times on the same incident and they are not
fully aware of each other’s doings. Following these findings
several novel tools and displays were designed to facilitate
payload switching among members of the team (see for example
Porat et al., 2011). Probably, the most successful facilitating
tool was the “Castling Rays,” which is a switching decision
aid, enabling operators to visually view which UAS has the
best view of “their” target at any given moment (Porat et al.,
2010).
Study 4
Problem: There was a requirement to increase the number of
UGVs that one operator can control. The main problem with
UGVs is that their level of autonomy is lower, hence more
attention needs to be allocated to navigation and driving issues
than in UAVs. At the time tested, the problem domain was still
TABLE 4 | Performance measures—Team of 3 vs. one operator controlling
3 UAVs.
Performance measure Team of UAVs UAVs + toolkit
3—3 UAVs 1 operator—3
Misses of vehicle exits 1% 3%
Misses of vehicle entrances 1% 3%
Misses of a suspect vehicles 0% 0.5%
Multiple reporting of the same vehicle 25% 8%
Mission stabilization time 13min (SD 3) 3.5min (SD 1.2)
TABLE 3 | Performance measures—Team of 2 vs. one operator controlling two UAVs.
Performance measure Team of 2—2 UAVs 1 operator—2 UAVs 1 operator—2 UAVs + toolkit
Misses of vehicle exits 2% 2% 3%
Misses of vehicle entrances 3% 4% 3%
Misses of a suspect vehicles 0.5% 0.7% 0.5%
Multiple reporting of the same vehicle 15% 5% 5%
Mission stabilization time 10min (SD 2.5) 6min (SD 1.75) 2min (SD 0.8)
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FIGURE 7 | Observing camera (above) and navigating camera
(below)—Condition A.
within the realm of multiple operators controlling a single system
vs. a single operator.We compared performance of two operators
controlling (navigating and observing) one UGV to one operator
controlling one UGV.
Study Question: Will two operators controlling one UGV




2:1—Two operators controlled one UGV: one operator
performed the navigation task and one operator performed the
observation task, while scanning a border fence.
Participants
Six highly experienced participants, reserve soldiers in an elite
engineering unit with experience in controlling remote robots
such as ANDROS and Mini-ANDROS participated in this
condition. They had 2–6 years of experience in operating military
UVGs (mean: 3.5), and their age ranged from 25 to 30 (mean:
26.8). All were compensated for their time.
Procedure
Each UGV had a navigation camera and an observation camera
for scanning the fence for obstacles and hazards (Figure 7). The
UGV moved very slowly (7 km/h). One operator performed the
navigation task (including health monitoring—alerts were both
color coded and audible), and one performed the observation
task. The experimental trial took about an hour. In this period,
a total of 100 events occurred (obstacle, hazard on the fence, fault
in the vehicle).
Results
Results are displayed in Table 5.
Performance was acceptable with a relatively low rate ofmisses
of obstacles. However, there were synchronization problems
TABLE 5 | Performance measures of the initial state.
Performance measure Initial state
Time to identify an obstacle 4 s (SD 1.5)
Missing an obstacle* 3%
Time to identify a hazard on the fence 3 s (SD 1.5)
Missing a hazard on the fence 2%
*All missed obstacles were of type “pitfall.” Pitfalls are more difficult to identify than above
ground hazards such as a log put on the ground.
TABLE 6 | Performance measures—initial state vs. condition A.
Performance measures Initial state Condition A
Time to identify an obstacle 4 s (SD 1.5) 7 s (SD 2.3)
Missing an obstacle* 3% 6%
Time to identify a hazard on the fence 3 s (SD 1.5) 9 s (SD 3)
Missing a hazard on the fence 2% 5%
*All missed obstacles were of type “pitfall.” Pitfalls are more difficult to identify than above
ground hazards such as a log put on the ground.
among the two operators, for example: operators had delays in
stopping the vehicle, which usually occurred after the observer




1:1—one operator controlled one UGV, performing both the
navigation and the observation tasks (as shown in the display in
Figure 7).
Participants
Three highly experienced participants, reserve soldiers in an
elite engineering unit with experience in controlling remote
robots such as ANDROS, and Mini-ANDROS participated in
this condition. They had 2–4 years of experience in operating
military UGVs (mean: 2.7), and their age ranged from 25 to 28
(mean: 26.3).
Results
Performancemeasures between the “Initial State” and “Condition
A” were compared. Results are displayed in Table 6.
One of the main problems in this condition was that operators
were missing pitfalls, which stopped the vehicle and increased the
time based performance measures to a large extent.
Condition B
Task
1:5—one operator observed cameras from five different UGVs,
scanning the fence for obstacles and hazards.
Participants
The same participants as in condition A.
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TABLE 7 | Performance measures—initial state vs. condition B.
Performance measures Initial State Condition B
Time to identify an obstacle 4 s (SD 1.5) 5 s (SD 3)
Missing an obstacle* 3% 4%
Time to identify a hazard on the fence 3 s (SD 1.5) 4.5 s (SD 2.5)
Missing a hazard on the fence 2% 3%
*All missed obstacles were of type “pitfall.” Pitfalls are more difficult to identify than above
ground hazards such as a log put on the ground.
FIGURE 8 | Display of the navigation cameras with additional
supporting tools and displays.
Results
Performancemeasures between the “Initial State” and “Condition
B” were compared. Results are displayed in Table 7.
Study 4 Summary
It was too complicated for one operator to perform the
observation and navigation tasks simultaneously (as in Condition
A). These two task types require different skills and performing
them at the same time generated major switching costs.
However, when operators were performing only one type of task
(observation or navigation), their performance has improved.
Based on these findings, several novel tools and displays were
designed to facilitate the navigation task, as shown in Figure 8.
Side cameras were added. A width pole display aided the operator
in estimating the width of the vehicle, and a path Predictor
displayed a virtual path that the navigator could follow. Initial
examination found this setup to decrease navigation time and
improve navigation accuracy. This needs to be further assessed,
however could be extremely useful especially when there are
communication delays in displaying the online video feed from
the navigation cameras.
Table 8 summarizes studies 3 and 4 as described above. For
each study, cognitive task demand and automation level were
added in a separate column (in line with Cummings et al., 2007a).
See Table 2 for the levels of automation legend.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In general, our results suggest that one experienced operator can
supervise (system health and status) up to 15 UASs efficiently
using moderate levels of flight control automation. Concerning
controlling UASs (mission and payload management), one
experienced operator cannot control more than three UASs, with
the level of complexity and automation that has been examined.
Providing the operator with various display aids and decision
support tools does improve performances of a single operator
(as in Study 3) but did not change the modal number to higher
extents.
Automation level, availability of decision aids, operators’
experience, complexity and criticality of the mission, operational
tempo, and cognitive resources and demands, all influence
the number of systems that one operator can control. For
this reason, comparison across studies is often complicated
and inaccurate. However, considering these limitations, our
findings do resemble findings of previous studies in the
essence that they are confirming that single operators are able
to control more remote vehicles as they are provided with
increasing automated decision support. Given some automated
navigation assistance and management-by-consent automation
in the mission management loop, an operator was able to control
4–5 vehicles (e.g., Ruff et al., 2004; Dunlap, 2006; Cummings
et al., 2007b). A leap in the amount of vehicles that one operator
could control was only seen if management-by-exception was
introduced, increasing the number to 8–12 vehicles (e.g., Lewis
et al., 2006; Cummings and Guerlain, 2007). Here, we were
able to show via Study 1 that a single operator can achieve
even a higher ratio of operation between 15 and 17 systems,
but only on a limited task or mission component (e.g., health
monitoring).
This finding may become more relevant in the future, if
organizations change the way they allocate and recruit operators.
Nowadays, most organizations, military amongst them, do not
want to parse their operators’ mission into “small” subtasks
and create high levels of skills in fine grained subtasks of
the mission among operators (i.e., train people to be experts
only on a single component of the mission, such as taxi
or health supervising). The current approach can be justified
when considering the danger of having operators lacking skill
while conducting dynamic, time critical, and situation critical
missions. However, the way operators’ allocations are done
today, it is inevitable for operators to maintain a certain
level of proficiency in all aspects of their mission. Evidently
this setting dictates that the level of automation of the
unmanned system and the use of decision aids become key
considerations.
Human operators are vital in this critical, high risk and
high demand environment. Keeping the human in the loop,
mostly for planning, re-planning, and control or at least
for being able to take over in automation malfunction is
essential in this domain. Therefore, fully autonomous operations
(automation level VI) are not expected any time soon. Using
intermediate levels of automation (i.e., supervisory control),
will not enable operators to exceed the control of few systems.
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FIGURE 9 | Left—operator capacity as a function of mission constrains (cf Cummings et al., 2007b). Right—Impact of UAS Number from an OR study
conducted in parallel to our studies (Shaferman and Shima, 2009).
Figure 9 on the left was taken from Cummings et al. (2007b)
and shows that the optimal bound they found was between
2 and 4 vehicles. The left region is primarily constrained by
operational demands, but the right region is dominated by
human performance limitations. Figure 9 on the right is taken
from an operation research study conducted in parallel to
Studies 1–4 and on similar urban area conditions (Shaferman
and Shima, 2009). It shows that adding the first and second
UAV had the most significant influence on mission performance.
Above four systems, the area covered, and the added value of
more assets became negligible. Hence, organizations need to
identify whether there are justified operational cases where one-
to-many ratios of more than four are needed. If those cases are
sparse, then perhaps more design effort can be geared toward
sharing of assets among operators (MOMU) in an efficient and
effective way.
Concerning the operation of UGVs, when the operator
performed only one task, as in study 4, condition B (observation
task), performance was satisfactory since the operator focused
primarily on maintaining awareness for obstacles and hazards.
However, when the operator had to navigate the vehicle
and observe the fence (as in study 4, condition A), it was
too complicated to perform. Dynamic task switching between
different functions resulted in greater cognitive workload for
the operator than performing only one type of task. In both
UASs and UGVs, the human and the automated systems
are geographically separated, and therefore face difficulties,
which are inherent in remote perception, such as overcoming
the “keyhole” or “soda straw effect” (Voshell et al., 2005).
Controlling and navigating UGVs is more complex than UASs
with regard to spatial perception. While GPS technology
may be very effective in providing UASs with positioning
information that meets their navigational needs, their use in
UGVs may be limited by reliability and accuracy constraints
(Chaimowicz et al., 2005). For example, a positioning error
of one or two meters may have little effect when controlling
a UAS, however it could have crucial results when navigating
a UGV.
Successful interaction with any human and automated system
is influenced by many factors including vehicle characteristics
(air, ground), task characteristics (complexity, number of
vehicles controlled, time pressure, workload), environmental
characteristics (terrain characteristics, quality, obstacles), and
technological constraints (available bandwidth, communication
delays). Thus, design specifications of automated decision
support aids will differ according to the unique needs of the
human operator in each situation. Indeed, the decision support
tools that were developed in this study for the aerial and
the ground domain differ in their design and implementation
(e.g., width pole display for the ground vehicle) but there
are also many commonalities in the essence of things (e.g.,
coupling of vehicles is suitable for both aerial and ground
vehicles).
In MOMU environments, as seen in Study 3, when the tasks
are similar or when the interest areas overlap (i.e., a connection
between the video feeds), one operator has an advantage to a team
who need to collaborate and coordinate. However, when there is
no connection between the video feeds, a team has an advantage
to a single operator. Thus, one of the considerations to prefer one
operator to a team is the amount of overlap between the different
video sources covered by the payloads. Taking this findings to a
practical level, in the MOMU operational settings we strive to
gain a consistent ratio of one operator controlling two UASs with
some flexibility, thus controlling up to three UASs per operator
on demand, and supervise up to six UASs where the covered areas
of the UASs are related.
WHERE CAN WE GO FROM HERE AND
BROADEN THE UNDERSTANDING AND
ADDED VALUE OF MOMU
ENVIRONMENTS?
The first notion is that automation is a tricky tool. When not
tailored to the task, it can easily cause high operator workload,
and challenge the “keep the human in the loop” principle.
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Although this statement may seem true for most human system
interfaces, when applying automation in critical and complex
environments, such as MOMU, a first step would be to perform
a thorough behavioral and cognitive task analysis to understand
the cognitive requirements of the task (e.g., decisions, situation
awareness, cues, judgment points). Once the different tasks,
requirements and possible errors are understood, tailoring the
display design and the automation level to the desired setup
becomes possible. It should be acknowledged that different
sections/parts/sub-tasks of the entire mission are perceived
differently at separate stages of the mission process. For example,
different automation needs are required for locomotion between
areas of interest, as opposed to loitering on a specific target area.
This implies that Cummings et al. (2007a) control loops could be
further divided into even smaller chunks, and for each chunk one
should match the required and desired automation level.
The second notion is that the scenarios used in our studies
assumed similarity: all operators had the same type of experience
and training, and all systems were alike. While this is a typical
mode of operation, it is evident that this is just one possibility.
In the U.S. military operations in Iraq, for example, more
than 100 UASs of 10 different types were used (Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 2004). The rising
question becomes howMOMUoperations may vary if there were
multiple types of vehicles and operators with various training and
capabilities. One needs also to reconsider the traditional mission
allocation. Recent studies tried to define the qualifications and
training required from an operator that is expected to control an
increasing number of UASs. Parasuraman et al. (2014) discussed
the possibility of selecting and training operators according to
their molecular genetics. Perhaps now is the time to initiate
specialization of operator roles. In order to do so, it would be
necessary to revisit the main operational tasks and reallocate
them in view of mission benefit. Changes in the function
allocation and the nature of task differentiation between human
operators and unmanned systems could significantly alter the
cognitive loads of the operators when performing the mission
(Cuevas et al., 2007). We should introduce flexibility into our
rigid-traditional “task thinking,” and let go of beliefs that tie us
down and stop the evolvement: must human operators fly the
platform? Can we mentally not technically—enslave the platform
to the mission needs?
A third direction would be to develop tools and decision-
making aids. In our studies tools and techniques that may
facilitate operators in MOMU environments were introduced
(e.g., Porat et al., 2010). Tool development was done in a
bottom up approach, i.e., based upon needs retrieved from SMEs
and geared toward solving particular challenging operational
situations. Since the tools were not yet tested in real world
settings, it would be interesting to examine how they integrate
into UASs MOMU environments and affect the metrics of
performance. Fern et al. (2011) for example proposed other
alternatives to facilitate UASMOMU operations. It would also be
interesting to examine whether tools can be transferred to other
MOMU settings such as ground vehicles or drones.
Fourth, our studies focused on the allocation among operators
in one team while conducting a single scenario, one can start
looking at the broader picture—how to break operations into
teams, how to assign and allocate the correct number of assets
and operators to each one of the teams, and how to coordinate
among teams of MOMU operators.
All these former suggestions lead toward the notion that a
more top-down approach needs to be developed in order to
provide a coherent way to distribute responsibilities and tasks
in MOMU environments. This direction of adjusting resources
and personnel according to mission needs is in line with
future intentions and models in other domains. For example,
in the medical domain, the NHS recent report “Five year
forward view” (NHS England, 2014), argues that England is
too diverse for a “one size fits all” care model, services need
to be integrated around the patient and support their changing
needs. Different local health communities will be able to decide
which care delivery model best supports their needs, such as
a multispecialty community provider model which is a multi-
disciplinary team that can include different specialties such as
nurses, therapists and other professionals combined with the
latest digital technologies, or a specialized care model which is
a surgery that specializes in one area such as cancer and provides
care only for these patients. All to support the main goal, which
is providing the best care for patients. Translating this to our
domain and the task specific requirements, we can reach to the
extreme cases where a team of operators will control only one
asset and vice versa, where a single operator will control up to 15
assets simultaneously (e.g., taxi).
Finally, with regard to Human-Robot Interaction, it is
inevitable that people of various abilities and skills will be
surrounded bymultiple platforms of various kinds and autonomy
levels. Much of what is now known from the realm of UASs
can be used to facilitate efficient asset sharing and mission
successes among other populations. Just to mention one, in the
not so far future, the elderly community will be utilizing robotics
assistants of various kinds, whether operated by caregivers or by
the users themselves. Many of the questions that were raised here
about operators’ skills, tools to facilitate cooperation and sharing
and mission accomplishment will be relevant to these domains
as well.
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